Algeria’s foreign-reserve buffer shrinks about 40% from its peak
A small rebound in reserves barely interrupts Algeria’s sustained loss of foreign-currency savings. The official dinar remains comparatively steady, but financing imports while preserving that stability is becoming a harder balancing act.
Algeria’s foreign-reserve buffer has been shrinking steadily, leaving less room to absorb weak export earnings or rising import costs. The pattern looks less like a temporary cash-flow squeeze than a persistent drain on the country’s external savings, even as the official exchange rate shows little outward strain.
Reserves excluding gold fell from $71.3 billion in September 2024 to $42.5 billion in August 2026. The latest reading was slightly above July’s $42.2 billion, but earlier rebounds also failed to halt the downward trend. A modest monthly improvement is not yet evidence that the underlying pressure has eased.
The most plausible explanation is a mismatch between hydrocarbon receipts and demand for foreign currency. Oil and gas dominate Algeria’s export earnings, making the flow of dollars and euros sensitive to energy prices, export volumes and payment timing. Softer receipts would weaken that inflow, while imports of food, machinery and industrial inputs continue to require foreign currency. Strong domestic energy consumption can also constrain the amount available for export.
Public spending probably adds to the pressure by supporting demand for imported goods and equipment. Government expenditure is largely in dinars, but the purchases it stimulates can ultimately generate foreign-currency bills. If export receipts and other inflows do not meet those bills, reserves provide the bridge. Valuation changes and external payments can also move the reserve total, although the persistence of the decline points towards a broader financing imbalance.
Meanwhile, the official exchange rate stood at 133 dinars per dollar in September 2026, a depreciation of about 3% over the preceding year. Algeria manages its currency and restricts capital movements, so the official rate need not adjust quickly when foreign-currency availability tightens. Its relative calm is therefore not proof that external pressure is absent.
For importers, the crucial issue is access to foreign currency, not just its quoted price. Preserving a stable official rate while reserves decline may require tighter import approvals or foreign-exchange allocation. Food wholesalers, pharmaceutical businesses and manufacturers reliant on imported components would be exposed to delays. Construction and investment projects could face difficulty obtaining machinery, while households could feel the effects through shortages or higher retail prices.
The remaining buffer still gives policymakers room to finance essential purchases. But without an import bill, its size cannot be translated into a reliable measure of import cover. The direction is clearer: continued losses would narrow the choice between allowing more currency depreciation, restraining import demand and accepting further reserve depletion. Depreciation would itself raise the dinar cost of imports.
Watch hydrocarbon receipts, import payments and access to official foreign exchange. A sustained reserve recovery would suggest that inflows are catching up with demand; another isolated monthly rise would offer little reassurance.
Analysis by MENACodex. The reasons and effects discussed are our reading; every figure traces to official data.
Where each figure comes from (6)
- 40% — Over the last three years the highest reading was $71.3 billion in September 2024; the latest is about 40% below it. Source: IMF — International Financial Statistics, IMF Data (SDMX 3.0) · open the source
- $71.3 billion — Recent path: September 2024 $71.3 billion; October 2024 $70.2 billion; November 2024 $70 billion; December 2024 $68.4 billion; January 2025 $66.8 billion; February 2025 $64.9 billion; March 2025 $64.4 billion; April 2025 $63.2 billion; May 2025 $61.8 billion; June 2025 $61.4 billion; July 2025 $63.4 billion; August 2025 $61.1 billion; September 2025 $59 billion; October 2025 $56.4 billion; November 2025 $54.9 billion; December 2025 $52.5 billion; January 2026 $50.6 billion; February 2026 $48.1 billion; March 2026 $44.7 billion; April 2026 $44 billion; May 2026 $44.4 billion; June 2026 $44.2 billion; July 2026 $42.2 billion; August 2026 $42.5 billion Source: IMF — International Financial Statistics, IMF Data (SDMX 3.0) · open the source
- $42.5 billion — Recent path: September 2024 $71.3 billion; October 2024 $70.2 billion; November 2024 $70 billion; December 2024 $68.4 billion; January 2025 $66.8 billion; February 2025 $64.9 billion; March 2025 $64.4 billion; April 2025 $63.2 billion; May 2025 $61.8 billion; June 2025 $61.4 billion; July 2025 $63.4 billion; August 2025 $61.1 billion; September 2025 $59 billion; October 2025 $56.4 billion; November 2025 $54.9 billion; December 2025 $52.5 billion; January 2026 $50.6 billion; February 2026 $48.1 billion; March 2026 $44.7 billion; April 2026 $44 billion; May 2026 $44.4 billion; June 2026 $44.2 billion; July 2026 $42.2 billion; August 2026 $42.5 billion Source: IMF — International Financial Statistics, IMF Data (SDMX 3.0) · open the source
- $42.2 billion — Recent path: September 2024 $71.3 billion; October 2024 $70.2 billion; November 2024 $70 billion; December 2024 $68.4 billion; January 2025 $66.8 billion; February 2025 $64.9 billion; March 2025 $64.4 billion; April 2025 $63.2 billion; May 2025 $61.8 billion; June 2025 $61.4 billion; July 2025 $63.4 billion; August 2025 $61.1 billion; September 2025 $59 billion; October 2025 $56.4 billion; November 2025 $54.9 billion; December 2025 $52.5 billion; January 2026 $50.6 billion; February 2026 $48.1 billion; March 2026 $44.7 billion; April 2026 $44 billion; May 2026 $44.4 billion; June 2026 $44.2 billion; July 2026 $42.2 billion; August 2026 $42.5 billion Source: IMF — International Financial Statistics, IMF Data (SDMX 3.0) · open the source
- 133 — Recent path: October 2024 133; November 2024 134; December 2024 134; January 2025 136; February 2025 135; March 2025 134; April 2025 133; May 2025 133; June 2025 131; July 2025 130; August 2025 130; September 2025 129; October 2025 130; November 2025 130; December 2025 130; January 2026 130; February 2026 130; March 2026 132; April 2026 132; May 2026 133; June 2026 133; July 2026 133; August 2026 133; September 2026 133 Source: IMF — International Financial Statistics, IMF Data (SDMX 3.0) · open the source
- 3% (rounded from 2.7%) — Over the last three years the highest reading was 137 in October 2023; the latest is about 2.7% below it. Source: IMF — International Financial Statistics, IMF Data (SDMX 3.0) · open the source